The EU-Turkey deal breakdown: how securitisation narratives are reproduced through externalisation

When Turkey opened its borders in February 2020, the responses from EU states clearly illustrated the fact that externalisation is a tool used to exacerbate securitisation narratives within the international refugee regime. Such narratives have harmful impacts upon displaced people across the globe.[i]

The EU-Turkey deal breakdown

Turkey has hosted the majority of individuals who have fled the Syrian Civil War since its outbreak in 2011. However, in February 2020, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that he would be opening the Greek-Turkish border, arguing that the EU had failed to fulfil their responsibilities under the deal. At this point, Turkey was hosting more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees, following the escalation of violence within the Idlib province, and had spent an estimated $40 billion on costs associated with hosting those displaced; the EU, on the other hand, had delivered just $3.5 billion of aid, and – according to President Erdoğan – failed to respond appropriately to the mounting humanitarian crisis within the region.

Those who reached Greece were met with violence: the Greek police and coast guards used tear gas, water cannons, and shot at migrant’s dinghies, resulting in undisclosed numbers of deaths and injuries. The exact number of individuals who passed into Greece (and beyond) is also disputed (estimated at anywhere between 10,000 and 100,000), and the repercussions on Turkey’s relationship with the EU are still unfolding; however, the event did expose striking insights into how securitisation narratives are reproduced through the EU’s externalisation tactics.

The European Union’s response

Immediately following President Erdoğan’s announcement, the EU condemned the actions of Turkey, and praised Greece, with President Ursula von der Leyen describing the nation as Europe’s ‘shield’ and providing €700 million of aid – half of which was allocated to upgrading border infrastructure. The use of the term ‘shield’ is highly militarised and suggests that the groups of ‘irregular’ migrants represent a security threat, rather than a group of vulnerable individuals fleeing persecution in search of safety. In a similar fashion, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis stated that “The borders of Greece are the external borders of Europe. We will protect them.”[ii] and Gerald Knaus (architect of the EU-Turkey deal) described President Erdoğan as ‘weaponizing’ migrants.[iii]

The impact on asylum seekers and refugees

These securitised externalisation policies have harmful and far-reaching consequences for migrants across the globe. For instance, they lead to an increase in discriminatory and xenophobic beliefs amongst host communities. Prior to the breakdown of the EU-Turkey deal, hosts on the Greek island of Lesvos had been extremely accommodating – they had welcomed migrants and even baked them traditional food upon their arrival. However, in the weeks following the opening of the Turkish border, these attitudes changed, and were replaced with far more hostile attitudes; when migrant boats approached the island, residents began to protest, and they could be heard shouting: “Illegals! Go back! We don’t care about the babies — they’re not ours!”[iv] This shows that the local people no longer viewed the asylum seekers as fleeing persecution, but rather coming to take something that they were not entitled to, and the use of the term ‘irregular migrants’, once again homogenized diverse migrant groups, removing asylum seeker’s vulnerabilities and needs.

Such discriminatory behaviours extend beyond the general public to officials such as police and coast guards. When an issue becomes securitised, what is deemed an acceptable response to a ‘threat’ changes: excessive use of force and violence become normalised and excused, as illustrated by the shooting at migrant’s dinghies discussed above; this was clearly a disproportionate act of ‘self-defence’ against a group of unarmed individuals, and yet public outcry was minimal. Hence, securitisation leaves migrants at a greater risk of experiencing violence.

As a result of these factors, the desire and need for migrants to continue their journeys in search of safety is increased. Migrants will therefore be willing to risk more dangerous routes – during 2020, more than 500 migrants died after their boats capsized in the Mediterranean Sea. Smuggler networks also become increasingly advanced as borders become more securitised, rather than being deterred from operating, which nations argue is one of the benefits of funding externalisation efforts. Disturbingly, for those without the resources or connections to travel via riskier routes, the decision is commonly made to return to their homelands, even with the fear of persecution that caused them to flee still present.

Moving forwards

It would therefore be logical to recommend that: (i) international organisations – particularly UNHCR – and global governments should hold one another accountable to ensure that international law is upheld; and (ii) the governing conventions and laws within international law which relate to externalisation should be tightened so that such practices are not centred around the assumption that those seeking asylum are a threat, and rather, externalisation efforts should focus on supporting host countries in building their capacity to uphold the human rights of refugees within their countries and also reducing the likelihood of refugee-producing events occurring.

However, given the limited success witnessed in recent years in ensuring powerful states adhere to international law, or even more optimistically lobbying for further reform of such laws to take place, it appears as though these targets are unlikely to materialise. Thus, without discrediting the nobility of advocacy efforts to uphold international law and ensure that states are held accountable, it is arguably more realistic to aim for smaller scale reform through civil society activism.

Such activism includes: (i) engaging with local law enforcement and border control officers to ensure that migrant’s human rights are not being infringed upon, and processes align with internationally recognised codes (and when this is not the case, lobbying for change through relevant stakeholders); (ii) aiding in refugee assimilation through local community action, such as language classes, legal support, and providing educational materials on local cultural norms; and (iii) facilitating relationships between local communities and migrants, through supporting dialogues between the groups and also sharing materials on the experiences faced by asylum seekers within their home countries.