Post-Coup Human Rights for the Rohingya: Paving A Path Forward

In early 2021, the military in Myanmar – the Tatmadaw – seized power in a coup d’état. Its actions, on the one hand, mean ill for the Rohingya ethnic group, which has long faced persecution in the country. On the other hand, its power grab may have inadvertently united several ethnic groups against itself in opposition, generating optimism for a more democratic and pluralistic Myanmar, where the Rohingya regain recognition. This article investigates the potential for progress in human rights of the ethnic group after the 2021 coup, as well as outlines strategies to pave a positive path forward for all citizens in Myanmar.

The Rohingya people have resided in Myanmar for generations. Despite this reality – and despite initially acknowledging them as legal citizens under the post-independence U Nu government – ever since the military seized power in a 1962 coup, Myanmar has consistently dismissed them as “illegal immigrants” from the area of modern-day Bangladesh, denying them membership among the “national” ethnic groups (who currently number to 135).

In Myanmar, the Rohingya have repeatedly faced persecution at the hands of successive governments, forcing many to leave the nation and seek sanctuary abroad, such as in neighboring Bangladesh and Indonesia. Many – about 148,000 – remain internally displaced within the country. The denial of citizenship, in addition to rendering the Rohingya stateless, accompanies the partial or complete denial of many other rights, such as the right to freedom of movement (Rohingya are typically not allowed to travel outside Rakhine State), and the right to education.

The Rohingya have endured multiple massive “clearance campaigns” (massacres) that may be tantamount to genocide, including the 2017 campaign that displaced virtually a million Rohingya. The Tatmadaw subjected Rohingya to rape, killing, and the confiscation of land. Both the various military regimes and the democratic government of Aung Suu San Kyi have categorically refused to recognize the ethnic group, and the military, more broadly, has even fanned the flames of ethnic violence against the Rohingya by exploiting social media.

There has also been considerable animosity between other ethnic groups and the Rohingya, including the Rakhine Buddhists and the Bamar majority. At least part of this ill will dates back to the time of British colonization, which saw the Rakhine chafe at the immigration of Bengali Muslims who integrated into the already present Rohingya Muslim population and saw the Rohingya and Rakhine fight and commit atrocities against each other in the Second World War. Extremist rhetoric from ultranationalists, including the Ma Ba Tha and Ashin Wirathu of the 969 Movement, have further inflamed the hatred in a symbiotic relationship with the army.

The rights of Rohingya – who predominantly live in Rakhine State – continue to remain in danger under junta rule. The junta has passed and enforced restrictions on movement, infrastructure development, and aid (including bans on United Nations operations) targeting Rohingya areas. These restrictions have culminated in the arrest and detention of more than 1,300 of the ethnic group for “unauthorized travel,” including children, and left many imprisoned for up to five years. There has also been an increase in water scarcity, food shortages, disease, and malnutrition, and these problems worsened after Cyclone Mocha hit Myanmar last May, impacting 600,000 Rohingya and killing hundreds of thousands of people.

Since the 2021 military coup that ousted Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar has remained under the iron fist of the junta, with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing taking charge. However, his grab for power sparked significant opposition – Myanmar erupted in protest as citizens took to the streets to demand the reinstatement of Aung San Suu Kyi under the “Civil Disobedience Movement” (CDM). The CDM consists of ‘’a diverse cross-section of Myanmar’s society, including ethnic and religious minorities’’, and the participants have found themselves braving arrests, torture, interrogations, and deaths. Since the coup, the military has attempted to suppress widespread opposition to the coup by launching airstrikes, burning villages, and arresting over 17,000 individuals.

In this context, a prospective successor in the National Unity Government (NUG) emerged, with the potential to reshape a more tolerant and inclusive national identity that accommodates religious and ethnic minorities. The NUG comprises various dissidents, including members of the NLD and diverse ethnic parties. Significantly, it has offered a “pluralistic, inclusive Burmese national identity” for the different ethnic groups in Myanmar – including the Rohingya.

 

What does Myanmar offer the Rohingya?

The NUG declared its intention to modify the Citizenship Law established in 1982, which eliminated the citizenship rights of the Rohingya, and has explicitly described the latter as nationals in an online statement that also acknowledged the 6th anniversary of the 2017 campaign the Rohingya suffered so much from. In a separate statement, it has described the Rohingya as citizens and expressed a commitment to abolishing the issuance of National Verification Cards that the government uses to mark the Rohingya’s “foreigner” status.

The NUG has taken multiple steps to appear as a changemaker. It has appointed Aung Kyaw Moe, a Rohingya, as its deputy – breaking a long exclusion of Rohingya from government positions. Dr. Win Myat Aye, currently the NUG humanitarian minister and had served as social welfare minister in the Suu Kyi administration at the time of the 2017 massacre and also defended it as a necessary response to terrorism, offered an apology ‘for failing “to bring justice to the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State”‘ – reversing course from his earlier position, which he blamed on misinformation from the military.

Ethnic Bamar and other non-Rohingya civilians, too, have formally apologized to the Rohingya for their complicity. Many have claimed that the military’s actions against Suu Kyi and pro-democracy protesters made them realize the error of their ways and empathize with what the Rohingya had endured. In 2021, hundreds of thousands of anti-junta protesters expressed solidarity with the Rohingya in the “#Black4Rohingya” social media campaign, sharing photos of themselves dressed in black and flashing a three-finger salute of resistance.

Nevertheless, even if the NUG can overcome the Tatmadaw – which itself has proven to be a daunting task – whether it will keep its promise or not has yet to be seen. Some of the NUG’s leaders were in the NLD, which had supported or ignored the military’s genocidal activities against the Rohingya. Apart from the NUG retaining Suu Kyi in her role as State Counsellor despite her complicity in the Rohingya genocide, Dr. Win Myat Aye, as a PBS Frontline documentary, “Myanmar’s Killing Fields” noted, had accompanied the military in Rakhine State at the height of its campaign (despite claiming unfamiliarity with the situation).

Members of other ethnic groups, such as the Shan and Karen, have already accused the NUG of “Burmanization”, hinting at continued ethnic tensions that may also impact the Rohingya. According to The Frontier, “most (NUG supporters) still seem unwilling to accept extending citizenship rights”, while others in Rakhine State were unhappy due to not being consulted.

The junta also claimed to support the repatriation of Rohingya refugees at first, possibly to stay in the good graces of other countries. This is in spite of Min Aung Hlaing – before he seized power over the national government in 2021 –  stating on social media in 2017, “We openly declare that absolutely, our country has no Rohingya race”. It may be too soon to rule out the NUG having political motives revolving around fostering good international relations, too.

While some Rohingya have expressed solidarity with the NUG, some also doubt if the NUG can or would protect their rights, expressing bitterness about the lack of acceptance and support they received from other ethnic groups in Myanmar before, as well as an absence of Rohingya persecution narratives in the anti-coup protests. Some Rohingya activists have expressed a desire to see further representation in leadership. According to one of its representatives, there is some wariness within the NUG – “Not all Rohingya will be accepted“, indicating the NUG would prefer to vet refugees before repatriation (for possible terrorist ties).

Nevertheless, survivors from various ethnic groups – including not only the Rohingya but also the Rakhine, Bamar, and Karen – filed a joint complaint in Germany against individuals within the Tatmadaw in a groundbreaking show of solidarity. The complainants specifically seek accountability for the military’s brutal crackdowns against Rohingya in Rakhine state – in addition to other crimes after its coup. In other words, the power of solidarity is real and transcends the NUG itself, even if there are ways to go.

 

Paving a path forward for the Rohingya and Myanmar

Going forward, Myanmar will need to pursue constitutional reform to avoid further marginalization and conflict. The NUG has already stated its intent to pursue constitutional reform to promote democracy, as well as consult groups such as the Rohingya to ensure it accounts for the voices of all in Myanmar. However, one specific step that may be worth taking is implementing a citizen’s sortition, as Ireland did when amending its own Constitution.

No matter which direction a government takes by itself, it is bound to disappoint the citizens it serves. However, if the people themselves are involved in making the decisions, it would make the latter more broadly legitimate and acceptable, ensure marginalized populations (including the Rohingya) have significant buy-in and influence over the political process, foster much-needed understanding among ethnic groups, as well as promote necessary change.

The selection of individuals from the population should be random, while also ensuring the group is representative and diverse in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, and region. It is important to ensure the Rohingya, who do not currently have the right to vote, are included in the selection process. Such a gathering – like both the Irish sortition and the French Climate Convention – would benefit from a mechanism that enables the participants to interact with subject matter experts, and in turn, increase their knowledge and understanding of the issues.

It is vital that said experts, given the gravity of the human rights crisis in Myanmar and concerning the Rohingya (and the nascent culture and understanding of democratic politics more broadly), include international election observers – including those from democratic Asian countries. Officials with expertise in human rights must also be involved.

In connection with the previous point, Myanmar will require the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms to enable the Rohingya to return and live in harmony with their brethren in Myanmar. A truth and reconciliation commission like the one in South Africa or the Rwandan post-conflict judicial system will be essential. In a nation where people cast doubt on the Rohingya’s very identities, truth is a necessary antidote to the poison of hatred that has consumed the country.

The post-conflict judicial system in Rwanda, which included local grassroots courts, national courts, and an international tribunal (specifically the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, or ICTR for short), could serve as a particularly useful model for Myanmar. While the system had major weaknesses that Myanmar must avoid replicating, such as biased adjudicators and the lack of a right to counsel, closely involving a supervisory authority like the ICC or an ICTR-like tribunal as part of the legal framework could help ensure that cases are following the rule of law.

Such commissions must also include Rohingya themselves as leaders and investigate specific human rights violations and violators (as opposed to merely offering broad condemnations), as previous commissions – such as those in 2018 and 2016 – have failed to do. They also must not shy away from acknowledging the Rohingya as Rohingya first and foremost (without dismissing them as illegal immigrants or only describing them as “Muslims”).

 

Conclusion

The Rohingya people are still facing persecution in Myanmar, which has led them to flee their homes. Despite this, there is hope for a more inclusive society in Myanmar. The key to achieving this is for the citizens to prioritize human rights above political affiliations and commit to the rights of all ethnic groups in the country. It will be important to understand the dangers of ethnic tensions, which both the military and extremist groups can continue to exploit. Only with a firm and mutual respect for human rights and international law can Myanmar move towards a genuinely pluralistic society that values all its citizens equally.